180109 KU Irrationality (2017W)
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Labels
An/Abmeldung
Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").
- Anmeldung von Fr 08.09.2017 12:00 bis Fr 22.09.2017 12:00
- Anmeldung von Mo 25.09.2017 12:10 bis Fr 29.09.2017 12:00
- Abmeldung bis Di 31.10.2017 12:00
Details
max. 25 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch
Lehrende
Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert
Donnerstag
12.10.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
Donnerstag
19.10.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
Donnerstag
09.11.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
Donnerstag
16.11.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
Donnerstag
23.11.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
Donnerstag
30.11.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
Donnerstag
07.12.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
Donnerstag
14.12.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
Donnerstag
11.01.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
Donnerstag
18.01.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
Donnerstag
25.01.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
Information
Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung
Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel
Active participation
Weekly written reflections that will discussed in class
Written exam (10 pages)
Weekly written reflections that will discussed in class
Written exam (10 pages)
Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab
Requirements
- The students should attend 9 or more seminars out of 11.
- The students are expected to read the texts carefully before class and be prepared to discuss the texts in class.
- The student are expected to upload 1 day in advance (Wednesday 12h00) a short (approx. 1 page) reflection on Moodle on the text we are reading. These reflections are mandatory.
- The students are expected to give one oral presentation of the central arguments of one of the readings during the semester.
- Finally, the students are expected to submit an essay one of the topics discussed in class. The essay is expected to be of 5000 words long. Guidelines and Deadlines will be uploaded on Moodle.
Students will achieve 5 ECTS points from participating successfully in this course.
- The students should attend 9 or more seminars out of 11.
- The students are expected to read the texts carefully before class and be prepared to discuss the texts in class.
- The student are expected to upload 1 day in advance (Wednesday 12h00) a short (approx. 1 page) reflection on Moodle on the text we are reading. These reflections are mandatory.
- The students are expected to give one oral presentation of the central arguments of one of the readings during the semester.
- Finally, the students are expected to submit an essay one of the topics discussed in class. The essay is expected to be of 5000 words long. Guidelines and Deadlines will be uploaded on Moodle.
Students will achieve 5 ECTS points from participating successfully in this course.
Prüfungsstoff
Seminar 1: October 12th
Davidson, D. (1980/2001) “Agency” from his Essays on Actions and Events (Ch. 3). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (2000/1957) Intention, Harvard University Press, §§ 21-27
Background reading:
Wilson, George and Shpall, Samuel, "Action", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/action
Grünbaum, T. (2010). Action and agency. In Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science (pp. 337-354). Springer Netherlands.Seminar 2: October 19th
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics: Book 7
Background Reading:
Mele, A. (1987) Irrationality, OUP, chapters 1 pp. 2-15Seminar 3: November 9th
Davidson, D. (2013/1969): “How is weakness of the will possible?” in Actions and Events, Oxford University Press, pp. 21-42
Background reading:
Davidson, D. (2010/1982): “Paradoxes of Irrationality” in Problems of Rationality, Oxford University Press, pp. 169-187Seminar 4: November 16th
Mele, A. (1987): Irrationality. An Assay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control, Oxford University Press, chapters 2 and 3 pp. 16-49Seminar 5: November 23rd
Holton, R. (2003) “How is strength of the Will Possible?” in Weakness of the Will and Practical Irrationality, Oxford University Press, pp.37-67Seminar 6: November 30th
Velleman, J. D. (2007): “What good is a will? In Action in Context (ed). Anton Leist, de Gruyter, pp.193215Seminar 7: December 7th
Rosalind Hursthouse (1991): “Arationality” in The Journal of Philosophy, vol LXXXVIII, no. 2, pp. 57-68
Helen Steward (2009): “Sub-intentional actions and the over-mentalization of agency” in Constantine Sandis (ed.) New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave MacmillanSeminar 8: December 14th
Alfred Mele (1987) Irrationality, OUP, chapters 4 and 9; pp. 50-61; pp. 121-137Seminar 9: January 11th
Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1988) “The Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers, and Liars” in Perspectives on Self-Deception (eds.) Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, University of California Press, pp.11-28Seminar 10: January 18th
Mark Johnston (1988) Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind” in Perspectives on Self-Deception, in Perspectives on Self-Deception (eds.) Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, University of California Press, pp.63-91Seminar 11: January 25th :
Jonathan Lear (1998): “The disruptive Mind” in Open Minded. Working Out the Logic of the Soul, Harvard University Press, pp. 80-122
Davidson, D. (1980/2001) “Agency” from his Essays on Actions and Events (Ch. 3). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (2000/1957) Intention, Harvard University Press, §§ 21-27
Background reading:
Wilson, George and Shpall, Samuel, "Action", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/action
Grünbaum, T. (2010). Action and agency. In Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science (pp. 337-354). Springer Netherlands.Seminar 2: October 19th
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics: Book 7
Background Reading:
Mele, A. (1987) Irrationality, OUP, chapters 1 pp. 2-15Seminar 3: November 9th
Davidson, D. (2013/1969): “How is weakness of the will possible?” in Actions and Events, Oxford University Press, pp. 21-42
Background reading:
Davidson, D. (2010/1982): “Paradoxes of Irrationality” in Problems of Rationality, Oxford University Press, pp. 169-187Seminar 4: November 16th
Mele, A. (1987): Irrationality. An Assay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control, Oxford University Press, chapters 2 and 3 pp. 16-49Seminar 5: November 23rd
Holton, R. (2003) “How is strength of the Will Possible?” in Weakness of the Will and Practical Irrationality, Oxford University Press, pp.37-67Seminar 6: November 30th
Velleman, J. D. (2007): “What good is a will? In Action in Context (ed). Anton Leist, de Gruyter, pp.193215Seminar 7: December 7th
Rosalind Hursthouse (1991): “Arationality” in The Journal of Philosophy, vol LXXXVIII, no. 2, pp. 57-68
Helen Steward (2009): “Sub-intentional actions and the over-mentalization of agency” in Constantine Sandis (ed.) New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave MacmillanSeminar 8: December 14th
Alfred Mele (1987) Irrationality, OUP, chapters 4 and 9; pp. 50-61; pp. 121-137Seminar 9: January 11th
Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1988) “The Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers, and Liars” in Perspectives on Self-Deception (eds.) Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, University of California Press, pp.11-28Seminar 10: January 18th
Mark Johnston (1988) Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind” in Perspectives on Self-Deception, in Perspectives on Self-Deception (eds.) Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, University of California Press, pp.63-91Seminar 11: January 25th :
Jonathan Lear (1998): “The disruptive Mind” in Open Minded. Working Out the Logic of the Soul, Harvard University Press, pp. 80-122
Literatur
Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis
Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:36
In this seminar we will question the role of irrationality in relation to human agency. If a rational agent is someone we hold responsible for her actions because she can account for reasons for doing them; how do we then describe the kind of agency where we don’t know why or what we do, like certain habits, or the kind of actions where we act despite our own will? What makes an act irrational? Is it a failure in the house of reason, as Davidson puts it? Is it an act of Akrasia, the weakness of the will or is it something that occurs out of a reflexive breakdown? Is it an interruption of our capacity to be self-interpreting animals, as Jonathan Lear would have it? The seminar will provide an overview of philosophical attempts to deal with irrationality. We will approach the following questions; how can we account for irrationality in relation to human agency; what counts as irrational acts in the first place and given that such acts exist; are we responsible for them and in which way? In the seminar, we will discuss classical texts on rationality and agency, and we will also focus on how to philosophically describe self-deception in order to address how we are affected in our everyday life by irrationality. We will thus gain an overview of irrational, arational, non-rational and unconscious aspects of our agential life that ultimately will lead us to discuss and question how we as human beings can make our actions transparent to ourselves qua being rational.Aim
The aim of the seminar is to address the relation between action and reason in the kind of actions that blurs this relation and make it questionable. The student will gain an overview of the debates within the philosophy of action as well as the philosophy of psychology concerning irrationality. Hereby the student will be able to assess and orient herself critically in the field of philosophical questioning that concern our human trademark; rationality. Further, the students will practice their basic philosophical skills in presenting arguments as they will be gibing oral as well as written presentations focused on the topics central to our readings.Method
Close reading of texts, joint discussion, oral presentations, written presentations. All readings for this course will be available on Moodle.