Universität Wien

040158 UK Strategic thinking in practice (BA) (2017W)

8.00 ECTS (4.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung

An/Abmeldung

Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").

Details

max. 50 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch

Lehrende

Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

Montag 02.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 03.10. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Montag 09.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 10.10. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Montag 16.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 17.10. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Freitag 20.10. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Montag 23.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 24.10. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Montag 30.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 31.10. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Freitag 03.11. 09:45 - 11:15 Studierzone
Montag 06.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 07.11. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Montag 13.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 14.11. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Freitag 17.11. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Montag 20.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 21.11. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Montag 27.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 28.11. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 04.12. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 05.12. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 11.12. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 12.12. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 08.01. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 09.01. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Freitag 12.01. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Montag 15.01. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 16.01. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Freitag 19.01. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Montag 22.01. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 23.01. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 29.01. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 30.01. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock

Information

Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

This course provides an introduction to Strategic Thinking. An individual takes part in a strategic interaction if her outcomes depend not only on her own actions but also on the action of other individuals. Examples include international relations, collective decision-making processes (such as voting), litigation, war, environmental negotiations, auctions, business interactions, biological evolution, sports competitions, internet routing etc.
The course introduces the students to modeling real-world strategic interactions using formal game theory and develops the necessary methods for analyzing the resulting game theoretic models.

Outline of the course:
1. Introduction
2. Static games, dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium
Some covered applications: Voting games, competition with market power, congestion games
3. Extensive form games, sub-game perfect equilibrium
Applications: Market leaders and followers, bargaining, vote buying.
4. Static games of imperfect information, Bayesian equilibrium
Applications: Auctions, Condorcet voting
5. Extensive form games with imperfect information, perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Applications: Reputation and signaling games, sequential voting, political platforms and lobbying

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

Assessment:

Assessment will be based on one midterm and one final test (written tests, 50% each). Additionally there will be non-mandatory problem sets which, however, are highly useful for learning the material and preparing for the exams. To further incentivize completing these assignments the students can supplement their total exam score with completed problem sets. Solving at least 90% of the problems yields a maximum of 20% of the points available in the two exams that can be used to compensate for points lost in the exams. The awarded points decrease linearly with solved problem set questions so that solving at least 60% of the problems yields 5% of the maximum exam score as supplemental points.

Pre-requisites:

The course will assume basic pre-requisites in microeconomics and probability!

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab

Prüfungsstoff

Literatur

The text for the course is Game Theory for Applied Economics, Robert Gibbons, Princeton University Press, 1992. The course will also have relatively complete lecture slides posted on the courses Moodle page.

For reference you can also use any introductory and other game-theory books, such as Osborne, M. (2004): An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. Osborne, M. and A. Rubinstein, (1994): A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press. Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1992): Game Theory, MIT Press. Myerson, R. (1992): Game Theory, Harvard University Press.

Some of the last examples are borrowed to some extent from Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson (2006): Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press.

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:28